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Facebook’s “Like” Button Plugin and User Tracking:
Stretching Outdated and Ambiguous Laws to
Protect User Privacy

DAVID BROKAW * ©

Abstract

With its 2020 decision in Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking
Litigation),1 the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the social
media site’s ability to track its logged-out users’ internet history using browser
“cookies.”2 Browser cookies are small bits of data that are transmitted between
internet users and a website and in Davis, these cookies were sent to Facebook
when the users accessed any website that had a Facebook browser extension
“plugin,” even when the users were logged out of Facebook. 3
The data sent in those browser cookies gave Facebook unauthorized access to
information about the internet history of its users.4 Facebook was able to match
this information to user profiles and sold this user information to advertisers for a
profit.5 In Davis, the Ninth Circuit held that the putative plaintiff class had standing
to sue Facebook for unjustly profiting from the unauthorized use of their data, even
if they did not show any actual economic injury. 6 Also, the Ninth Circuit endorsed
one position in a circuit split, finding that the unauthorized tracking of user internet
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1. 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020).
2. Id. at 595-96.
3. Id. at 596.
4. Id. at 596, 601.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 599.
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Facebook’s “Like” Button Plugin and User Tracking
usage with browser cookies, as Facebook was doing, could violate the Federal
Wiretap Act.7
By recognizing that the unauthorized use of user internet data can give plaintiffs
standing for economic claims and can implicate the Federal Wiretap Act,8 the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Davis could have broad ramifications on websites’ liability for
using cookies or internet plugins.9 This note will begin with the factual background
and procedural history of Davis, including a description of the technology Facebook
used to track the internet usage of its users.10 Then, this note will set forth the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis of the key issues raised by the plaintiff class on appeal, including
whether they had standing to bring their claims, and whether they sufficiently
pleaded their claims against Facebook for invasion of privacy, breach of contract,
and violation of the Federal Wiretap Act.11 Finally, this note will discuss the legal
impact of the decision in Davis and how it may affect future litigation over the
unauthorized use of user data by websites and social media companies. 12
I. The Case

“On April 22, 2010, Facebook launched [its] “Like” button [social plugin on
websites] outside of the Facebook domain.”13 An internet “plugin” is a program that
extends the functionality of an internet browser or other internet service. 14
Facebook’s “Like” button as well as other plugins extend the functionality of
websites on the internet by allowing users who click the plugin to not only share
content to Facebook from outside the Facebook website and indicate a “like” for
products posted to Facebook, but to also allow Facebook to track users visits to
these other websites with the Facebook widgets and plug-ins.15 The “Like” button
plugin was launched as part of Facebook’s “Open Graph” initiative, which was an

7. Id. at 608 (noting that a court following the First and Seventh Circuit Courts would adopt an
“understanding that simultaneous, unknown duplication and communication of GET requests do not exempt a
defendant from liability under the party exception[,]” while a court following the Third Circuit would adopt an
understanding that defendant website companies “were ‘the intended recipients’ of . . . duplicated GET
requests, and thus ‘[party] to [disputed] transmissions[.]’”).
8. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
9. See infra Section III.
10. See infra Section I.
11. See infra Section II.
12. See infra Section III.
13. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589
(9th Cir. 2020) (No. 17-17486).
14. Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 596 n.1 (9th Cir. 2020).
15. Bill Goodwin & Sebastian Klovig Skelton, Facebook’s Privacy Game – How Zuckerbuerg Backtracked on
Promises
to
Protect
Personal
Data,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM
(July
1,
2019),
https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Facebooks-privacy-U-turn-how-Zuckerberg-backtracked-onpromises-to-protect-personal-data.
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effort by Facebook to connect the social media service with other, outside websites,
envisioning a future where users could browse the web using their real identities
and “everything [can] be more personalized.”16
During the 24-hour period after Facebook launched the “Like” button, over one
billion internet users encountered the plugin online. 17 By the end of April 2010, over
50,000 websites featured the “Like” button plugin, and that September Facebook
announced that over 2 million different websites were using its’ plugin.18 The reach
and ubiquity of the “Like” button plugin has only continued to grow, and less than
a decade later, in 2018, Facebook claimed the “Like” button plugin appeared on
over 8.4 million different websites.19
Browser cookies are simple text files shared between user web browsers and the
websites they use which contain unique user identification information and share
that information with the website.20 When Facebook users visit the Facebook
website, Facebook allegedly creates cookies on its users’ browsers.21 Those cookies
store their user login ID information and then are able to collect the “referer
headers” from the web pages visited by users.22 A referer header request is a piece
of data passed between web browsers and websites which contains the web
address of the last page a user visited.23 These referer headers can be used to track
user internet usage and reveal other sensitive data.24

16. Caroline McCarthy, Facebook F8: One Graph to Rule Them All, CNET (Apr. 21, 2010, 10:25 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-f8-one-graph-to-rule-them-all/.
17. Jason Kincaid, 5,000 Websites Have Already Integrated Facebook’s New Social Plugins, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 29, 2010, 3:44 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/04/28/50000-websites-have-already-integratedfacebooks-new-social-plugins/.
18. Id; Leena Rao, Five Months In, 2 Million Websites Using Facebook’s New Social Plugins, TECHCRUNCH
(Sep. 30, 2010, 12:44 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/09/29/five-months-in-2-million-websites-usingfacebooks-new-social-plugins/.
19. Letter from Rebecca Stimson, Head of Pub. Pol’y, Facebook U.K., to Damian Collins, Digit., Culture,
Media
and
Sport
Comm.
Chair,
U.K.
House
of
Commons
(May
14,
2018),
https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-andsport/180514-Rebecca-Stimson-Facebook-to-Ctte-Chair-re-oral-ev-follow-up.pdf.
20. What Are Cookies? BBC: WEBWISE (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/guides/aboutcookies.
21. Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020).
22. Id.
23. Jennifer Kyrnin, How to Use the HTTP Referer, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/how-to-use-httpreferer-3471200 (updated Jan. 16, 2020); See also HTTP Headers, MDN WEB DOCS,
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers (modified Oct. 27, 2020) (providing background
on how HTTP headers are coded).
24. Referer Header: Privacy and Security Concerns, MDN WEB DOCS, https://developer.mozilla.org/enUS/docs/Web/Security/Referer_header:_privacy_and_security_concerns (modified July 22, 2020).
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After the introduction of the “Like” button plugin, some noticed the plugin’s
ability to track user internet usage, and privacy concerns quickly arose.25 Users were
concerned about Facebook’s ability to track them on websites other than Facebook
with the “Like” button, even when those users did not interact with the plugin. 26
Facebook’s data collection went even further: in September of 2011, an article was
published on a technology blog showing that Facebook was using browser “cookies”
associated with the Facebook “Like” plugin to collect data from Facebook users
which included those users’ personal information, even when those users were
logged out of Facebook.27 The information collected by Facebook’s cookies included
users’ referer headers, showing their browsing history, along with those users’
account identification numbers, effectively allowing Facebook to track its users
across the internet.28
Facebook’s tracking of its users’ internet usage through the “Like” button plugin
gave rise to legal action, including a lawsuit brought against Facebook by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).29 Facebook users also pursued litigation against
Facebook, filing lawsuits against Facebook in various federal courts that were then
consolidated into a class action suit against Facebook in the Northern District of
California.30 The consolidated suit alleged that Facebook knowingly tracked its
users, even when those users were logged out of Facebook, and that the data
Facebook collected from its users was valuable and marketable.31
Plaintiffs in the litigation represent a putative class of Facebook users with active
accounts between May 27, 2010, and September 26, 2011, a time period during
which they alleged that Facebook tracked its logged-out users’ internet activity.32
The plaintiff class filed their first complaint and presented several claims against
Facebook, including violation of the Electronic Communications Protections Act
(“Wiretap Act”), violation of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), invasion of
privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, conversion, and trespass to chattels.33

25. Geoff Duncan, Open Letter Urges Facebook to Strengthen Privacy, DIGIT. TRENDS (June 17, 2010),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/open-letter-urges-facebook-to-strengthen-privacy/.
26. Ian Paul, Advocacy Group Asks Facebook for More Privacy Changes, PC WORLD (June 17, 2010, 5:02 AM),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/199099/facebook_privacy_fixes.html.
27. Nik
Cubrilovic,
Logging
Out
of
Facebook
is
Not
Enough,
NIK CUBRILOVIC,
https://nikcub.me/posts/logging-out-of-facebook-is-not-enough (modified Oct. 5, 2019).
28. Id. See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020).
29. Facebook, Inc., Commission Order Modifying Order, File No. 092-3184 (F.T.C. 2020). See Davis, 956
F.3d at 597 n.3.
30. In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (ordering the transfer and
consolidation of eleven actions pending in various districts to the Northern District of California).
31. In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 927-28 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
32. Id. at 925.
33. Id. at 929; Davis, 956 F.3d at 597.
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Facebook filed a motion to dismiss these claims for lack of standing and
insufficient pleadings and the district court agreed, finding that although plaintiffs
had standing to bring their claims arising under the SCA and Wiretap Act, they failed
to adequately state a claim for relief under those statutes, and lacked standing to
bring the rest of their claims. 34 After their first district court dismissal, plaintiffs
were given leave to amend their first complaint, so they filed a second complaint
with similar claims as well as added claims for breach of contract and breach of duty
of good faith and fair dealing.35 The claims in the second complaint were also
dismissed, but plaintiffs were given leave to amend their claims for breach of
contract and breach of duty of good faith.36 Plaintiffs filed a third complaint which
only contained their claims against Facebook for breach of contract and duty of
good faith, but these claims were dismissed without leave to amend, exhausting
the remedies available to the plaintiff class at district court.37
Plaintiffs appealed from their third and final dismissal at district court to the
Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals.38 In Davis v. Facebook, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
held that the putative plaintiff class had standing to bring their claims against
Facebook.39 Although the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not adequately
plead their claims for violation of the SCA and breach of contract, they found the
remaining claims adequately pleaded, including their claims against Facebook for
violation the Wiretap Act and invasion of privacy.40
II. Legal Background and Court’s Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit upheld in part and reversed in part the decision of the District
Court for the Northern District of California by finding that the Plaintiffs had
standing and were able to adequately plead claims for invasion of privacy, intrusion
upon seclusion, trespass to chattels and fraud, statutory larceny, as well as claims
brought pursuant to the Wiretap Act, CIPA, and Computer Data Access and Fraud
Act; although the Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their breach of contract
and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, or their claims
brought pursuant to the SCA.41

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

In re Facebook, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 929-30.
In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 840 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
Id. at 848.
In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 916, 918, 922-23 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
Davis, 956 F.3d at 597.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 597-601, 608-11.
Id. at 597, 611.
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A. The Ninth Circuit Held that the Plaintiffs Had Standing to Pursue their Claims for
Invasion of Privacy, Intrusion Upon Seclusion, Breach of Contract, Breach of Good
Faith, as well as Claims Under The Wiretap Act and the California Invasion Of
Privacy Act (CIPA)
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the authority of the judicial branch to
resolving “cases” and “controversies.”42 The doctrine of “standing” arises from this
constitutional limitation and prevents federal court overreach by separating
justiciable claims, which are within the purview of the judicial branch of
government, from claims that the courts cannot resolve.43 Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife sets forth the test to determine whether plaintiffs have standing.44 To
establish standing, plaintiffs must fulfill three doctrinal elements: (i) their injury
must be an injury in fact; (ii) the injury must be causally connected to the challenged
conduct of the defendant; and (iii) it must be likely that their injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision by the court.45 For an injury to be an “injury in fact,” it must
be “concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or imminent.” 46
In Davis v. Facebook, Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court below that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims for invasion of
privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, breach of good faith, as well
as their claims under the Wiretap Act 47 and the California Invasion of Privacy Act
(CIPA).48 CIPA is a California wiretapping law similar the Federal Wiretap Act, which
protects internet users by creating a statutorily recognized right prohibiting others
from intercepting one’s electronic communications.49 All of these claims related to
the plaintiffs’ privacy interest, which both the Ninth Circuit and the Northern
District of California found were adequately alleged. 50 Plaintiffs alleged that
Facebook tracked their potentially sensitive and personal internet browsing history
and connected it with their personal Facebook profiles, creating a “cradle-to-grave”
profile without users’ knowledge or consent. 51 The Ninth Circuit found that
Facebook’s alleged data collection could deprive its users of the opportunity to
42.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
44. 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
48. 956 F.3d 589, 598 (2020); California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-638.55.
49. Davis, 956 F.3d at 606-07 (describing the similarities between the federal wiretap act and CIPA);
California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-638.55; Kevin M. McGinty, Alleged Wiretap Act and
CIPA Violations Held to Satisfy Spokeo Test for Standing in Latest Gmail Privacy Class Action, MINTZ (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2016-10-03-alleged-wiretap-act-and-cipa-violations-heldsatisfy-spokeo.
50. Davis, 956 F.3d at 598-99.
51. Id.
43.

94

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Brokaw (Do Not Delete)

8/30/2022 3:57 PM

DAVID BROKAW
control or prevent Facebook’s “exploitation of their private lives.” 52 The plaintiffs
alleged conduct by Facebook which clearly invaded their historically recognized
right to privacy, so they had standing to pursue their privacy-related claims against
Facebook.53
However, the district court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed on whether the
plaintiffs had standing to bring their fraud-related state common law and statutory
claims.54 Plaintiffs’ fraud-related claims required plaintiffs to demonstrate that
some actual injury may have occurred, and plaintiffs could only recover the actual
damages incurred from the Facebook’s conduct.55 Unlike other data privacy cases,
plaintiffs alleged their browsing data had intrinsic value and was marketable, but
they did not show that Facebook’s use of the data prevented them from also selling
it or diminished its value.56 The district court reasoned that plaintiffs were not
required to show economic harm to have standing for their their privacy-related
claims, but the plaintiff class did not show the requisite economic harm or loss to
bring their fraud-related claims against Facebook.57
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs had standing for their
fraud-related state common law and statutory claims.58 Under California law,
plaintiffs have a legal interest in the profits unjustly earned by Facebook through
use of their data, regardless of whether they planned to sell that data or whether
its value was reduced by Facebook’s use of it.59 Plaintiffs alleged that their browsing
history had economic value, and that Facebook used that information without their
authorization.60 Therefore, they sufficiently alleged that Facebook was unjustly
enriched by using their data, which entitled them to the profits Facebook had
unjustly earned and gave them standing for their fraud-related state claims.61 With
this holding, the Ninth Circuit supported an expansive view of standing for California
state fraud-related claims in data privacy cases, allowing them to be brought even
without showing economic injury.62 Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the
unauthorized usage of this data does not just implicate privacy concerns, but also
supports litigation against companies who unjustly enrich themselves by using the
data without authorization.63
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 599 n.4.
In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 931-32 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Id.; In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 842-43 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
Davis, 956 F.3d at 599-601.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
See id.
See id.
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B. The Ninth Circuit Held That the Plaintiffs Did Not Sufficiently Plead Claims for
Intrusion Upon Seclusion, Invasion Of Privacy, and Violation of the Wiretap Act;
Further, it was Held That the Plaintiffs Did Not Adequately Plead Claims Under the
Stored Communications Act or Breach of Contract
In the district court’s opinion below, all of the plaintiffs’ claims that were not
dismissed for lack of standing were dismissed for failure to adequately state a
claim.64 After holding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring all of their claims, the
Ninth Circuit turned to whether the putative plaintiff class had sufficiently pleaded
a claim for relief sufficient to bring their litigation against Facebook. 65 Standards for
the adequacy of plaintiffs’ claims for relief and Facebook’s motion to dismiss those
claims are set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 66 Subsequent case law
clarifies the standard for a well-pleaded complaint.67
Under Rule 8(a)(2), plaintiffs, at the pleading stage, must show that they are
entitled to relief from the court.68 Supreme Court decisions have clarified that this
claim for relief must be a “plausible claim for relief.” 69 As shown by Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, mere conclusory allegations by the plaintiffs are not
enough to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 70 Their claims must instead
enable the court to infer more than the mere possibility of the defendant’s
misconduct, viewing all of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in the light most
favorable to them.71
The Ninth Circuit first evaluated to the plaintiffs’ California state tort claims for
intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy.72 These claims are considered
together, and to establish these claims plaintiffs must plead that: (1) they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) the defendant’s intrusion on that privacy
was “highly offensive.”73

64.

In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 935-37 (2015).
In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 848-49; In re Facebook Internet Tracking
Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d. 916, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6).
67. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (iterating a two-prong test that courts should use in
evaluating whether a complaint is well-pleaded: (1) judges must separate the complaint’s factual allegations
from legal conclusions, and (2) judges must then assess whether the factual allegations “plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-555 (2007) (holding that “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957) (noting that all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require is “‘a short and plain statement of the
claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the ground upon which it rests”).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6).
69. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-555.
70. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
71. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
72. Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 601-06 (9th Cir. 2020).
73. Id. at 601 (citing Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal. 4th 272, 286-87 (2009)).
65.
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The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs sufficiently claimed they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.74 The Court argued that plaintiffs plausibly claimed
Facebook set a reasonable expectation, through language in its “Data Use Policy”
and “Help Center” pages, that Facebook would not track its logged-out users, so
plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy.75 Also, Facebook collected all URL
information from users visiting websites that used Facebook plugins, even data that
was potentially sensitive, and Facebook did so without notifying users that browser
cookies would track user internet activity after users had logged out of Facebook. 76
Two past Ninth Circuit cases addressing similar issues held that users did not
have an expectation of privacy when their Internet Protocol (“IP”) and URL
addresses were collected.77 In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that internet users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for their IP
address information because they should know that their IP addresses are
accessible by their internet service providers.78 Also, likening IP addresses to phone
numbers, the court in Forrester reasoned that IP addresses do not reveal the
content of a message any more than phone numbers would. 79 However, the
Forrester decision included in a footnote that users may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding URLs, which can contain sensitive information. 80
Ninth Circuit opinion Graf v. Zynga seemingly disagreed with the footnote in
Forrester.81 In Zynga, the Ninth Circuit held that Facebook users playing video
games made by Zynga while using Facebook did not have a reasonable expectation
to privacy regarding their URL information when Zynga and Facebook were able to
collect that information.82 However, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the URL
information in Zynga was less sensitive than the URL information which Forrester
foresaw as giving users a reasonable expectation of privacy.83

74.

Id. at 602-06.
Id. at 601-02.
76. Id. at 603.
77. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509-11 (9th Cir. 2008); Graf v. Zynga Game Network, Inc. (In
re Zynga Privacy Litig.), 750 F.3d 1098, 1107-09 (9th Cir. 2014).
78. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510 (hearing a “challenge[ to] the validity of computer surveillance that enabled
the government to learn the to/from addresses[,] . . . IP addresses[,] . . . and the total volume of information
transmitted to or from” the account of a defendant on trial for allegedly operating an ecstasy-laboratory).
79. Id.
80. Id. at n.6. This footnote reads “[s]urveillance techniques that enable the government to determine not
only the IP addresses that a person accesses but also the uniform resource locators (“URL”) of the pages visited
might be more constitutionally problematic. A URL, unlike an IP address, identifies the particular document
within a website that a person views and thus reveals much more information about the person’s Internet
activity.” Id.
81. Graf, 750 F.3d at 1108-09.
82. Id. at 1109.
83. Id. at 1108-09.
75.
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As the Ninth Circuit points out in Davis, the URL information in Zynga was not
problematic because it contained less potentially sensitive user data than that
foreseen by the dicta in Forrester. 84 The URL information in Davis was more
sensitive, and therefore distinguishable from that at issue in Zynga, allowing the
plaintiffs to sufficiently plead an expectation of privacy that could survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.85 In Davis, the URL information collected included “fullstring, detailed URLs,” which Facebook could use to link internet activity to user
profiles and even find out what search terms users had entered into a search engine
like Google before reaching a web page. 86 The increased sensitivity of the data
implicated in Davis distinguished it from the URL information in Zynga, giving
plaintiffs in data a reasonable expectation of privacy.87
The Ninth Circuit then addressed whether the plaintiffs provided sufficient
arguments that Facebook’s data collection practices could be found to violate the
Federal Wiretap Act and analogous California law CIPA. 88 Under the Wiretap Act, it
is unlawful to intentionally intercept an electronic communication without
authorization.89 However, there is an exemption to the Wiretap Act—it does not
impose liability on those who intercept communications they are “party” to, or
those where their interception is consented to by one of the parties. 90 Facebook
maintained that its collection of user data technically fell under the party
exemption, so was not a violation of the Wiretap Act. 91
If an internet user visits a web page, their browser sends a “GET request”—a
message directing the website to display the information that the user enters in
their browser’s URL bar.92 The GET request also sends the website a referer header
with the user’s URL information.93 In Davis, when users visited web pages with
Facebook plugins the Facebook plugins directed users’ web browsers to duplicate
and contemporaneously send GET request information to Facebook at the same
time as their browsers sent GET requests to the website, the intended recipient.94

84.

Id.; Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 604-05 (9th Cir. 2020).
Davis, 956 F.3d at 605-06.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 606-08.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).
90. Id. at § 2511(2)(d).
91. Brief for Appellee at 50-51, Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litigation), 956 F.3d 589 (9th
Cir. 2020) (No. 17-17486).
92. HTTP Requests, CODE ACAD., https://www.codecademy.com/articles/http-requests (last visited Nov. 5,
2020).
93. Davis, 956 F.3d at 607.
94. Id.
85.
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As noted in Davis, other federal courts of appeals have addressed this issue and
were split on whether conduct like Facebook’s could violate the Wiretap Act. 95 The
First and Seventh Circuits have held that the Wiretap Act could be violated by the
contemporaneous, unauthorized duplication and sending of internet
communications, and that the recipient of the unauthorized duplicate
communication could not invoke the “party” exemption from liability under the
Wiretap Act.96
In the First Circuit case Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy
Litig.), Pharmatrak provided its “NETcompare” web service to pharmaceutical
companies. 97 Pharmatrak had assured the pharmaceutical companies that the
NETcompare system would not collect personal data about the patients.98 However,
without the pharmaceutical companies’ or patients’ knowledge, personal patient
data was collected using the NETcompare system.99 Pharmatrak collected user data
by displaying images on the websites of pharmaceutical companies who used their
NETcompare service.100 Those images placed browser cookies on the computers of
users visiting those websites and were able to track user internet activity, similar to
Facebook’s tracking of users through cookies with internet plugins in Davis.101
The First Circuit explained that courts analyzing claims under the Wiretap Act
have differentiated between communications that are acquired while “in transit,”
which are interceptions under the Wiretap Act, from those acquired while “in
storage,” which are not.102 This distinction has made some courts unsure exactly
how to apply the Wiretap Act to internet communications, as they can both
considered both “in transit” and “in storage” at the same time. 103 However, the First
Circuit held that communications which are acquired “contemporaneous[ly]” with
their sending, like the communications in Blumofe or Facebook’s data collection in
Davis, are “interception[s]” as defined by the Wiretap Act. 104
The Seventh Circuit case United States v. Szymuszkiewicz also explains the
liability for contemporaneous duplication of communications under the Wiretap

95. Davis, 956 F.3d at 607-08; see Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.), 329
F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 705-07 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Google
Inc., 806 F.3d 125, 142-43 (3rd Cir. 2019).
96. Blumofe, 329 F.3d at 19-20; Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 707.
97. Blumofe, 329 F.3d at 12 (discussing NETcompare, which “was marketed as a tool that would allow a
company to compare traffic on and usage of different parts of its website with the same information from its
competitors’ websites”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 13-14.
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 21-22.
104. Id. at 22.
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Act.105 In Szymuszkiewicz, a revenue officer set up his supervisor’s e-mail client to
duplicate and forward all received e-mails to the revenue officer’s e-mail
account.106 The Seventh Circuit found that the e-mails were sent simultaneously
from the server to the supervisor and the revenue officer. 107 Contemporaneous
acquisition of those duplicate e-mails by the employee was an interception,
exposing the employee to liability under the Wiretap Act.108
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has disagreed, holding that conduct like
Facebook’s does not implicate the Wiretap Act.109 The Third Circuit case In re
Google, Inc. concerned third-party advertisements placed by Google on the
internet.110 Similar to Facebook’s collection of user data in Davis, when the In re
Google plaintiffs followed links in advertisements placed by Google, third-party
browser cookies duplicated and collected the GET requests sent by their computers
and compiled them into user internet histories.111 Those cookies included thirdparty cookies placed by the advertisers, which were used to track and monitor
individual users’ web activity in order to deliver personalized advertisements.112
Google assured its users that they could block all of Google’s browser cookies by
enabling their “cookie blocker” on their Safari or Internet Explorer web browsers. 113
However, the browser cookie blockers had loopholes which allowed Google and
advertisers to still place cookies on user computers, even with the blockers
enabled.114 When users visited websites through Google advertisements, code
embedded by Google circumvented their cookie blocker programs and allowed
third-party cookies to track users.115
The Third Circuit split from the First and Seventh Circuits, holding that
Google’s placement of browser cookies on user cookies that duplicated and sent
user information to advertisers without user authorization did not violate the
Wiretap Act.116 Third-party advertisers were the “intended recipients” of the user
information collected through their browser cookies, so the Third Circuit found they
were party to the communication and therefore exempted from liability. 117 The
Third Circuit stressed that the Wiretap Act is not necessarily intended to stop all
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

100

Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 701.
Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 705-06.
In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d 125, 142-43 (3rd Cir. 2015).
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 142-43.
Id.
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fraud and does not provide an equitable remedy to plaintiffs.118 Therefore, “parties”
like the third-party advertisers in In re Google could be exempt from liability for
their collection of duplicated and contemporaneously sent user data, even when
they collected that data deceitfully.119
In Davis, the Ninth Circuit sided with the First and Seventh Circuits and disagreed
with the Third Circuit by holding that the putative class of users had adequately
pleaded their claim under the Wiretap Act. 120 The court in Davis found that the
unauthorized duplication and contemporaneous sending of information like users’
GET requests over the internet was an interception and that Facebook could not
claim they were “party” to that contemporaneously sent information. 121 The Ninth
Circuit reached this conclusion by examining the objectives of the Wiretap Act, as
shown by its legislative history.122 The “paramount objective of the [Wiretap Act] is
to protect effectively the privacy of communications.” 123 The Wiretap Act’s
legislative history also indicates that it aims to prevent “an unseen auditor” from
accessing communications.124 Exempting conduct like Facebook’s would undermine
the aims of the Wiretap Act by “allowing the exception to swallow the rule,”
permitting third parties to deceitfully intrude on communications.125
Unlike their Wiretap Act claims, the Ninth Circuit in Davis disagreed that plaintiffs
had adequately pleaded a violation of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”). 126
Under the SCA, it is unlawful to gain unauthorized access to a “facility” where
electronic communication services are provided and to obtain communications
which are “electronically stored” in that facility without authorization.127 Electronic
storage includes “temporary, intermediate storage” of electronic communications
“incidental to [their] transmission.”128 It also includes storage of electronic
communications for “backup protection” purposes.129
Plaintiffs argued that the toolbar on their browsers, where they typed URL
addresses of web pages they then searched for, is an electronic storage “facility”
for purposes of the SCA, even though it often contains the URL information for less
than a second.130 They maintained that the URL information was stored in their
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 143-44.
Id.
Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litigation), 956 F.3d 589, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id. (quoting Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Id. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154, 2182.
Davis, 956 F.3d at 608.
Id. at 608-09.
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
Id. § 2510(17).
Davis, 956 F.3d at 608.
Id. at 608-09.
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browser toolbars “incidental to” its transmission, until the user sends the URL
information to the website they intend to reach, so Facebook violated the SCA by
accessing that information.131 Plaintiffs also alleged that their browsing history
information was stored for backup protection purposes, so was protected under
the SCA132
Davis and other cases examining the Wiretap Act and SCA seem to suggest that
it is difficult to bring claims under both the Wiretap Act and the SCA for
unauthorized access of the same communications.133 The First Circuit case Blumofe
v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.) explains the storage-transit
dichotomy—that some courts have found that communications in storage are not
“interceptions,” and that only communications in transit are protected by the
Wiretap Act—while acknowledging that this framework has limited applicability to
internet transmissions, which may be both in storage and transit simultaneously. 134
However, Seventh Circuit case Szymuszkiewicz emphasized Congress in passing the
SCA did not repeal or replace any part of the Wiretap Act, and that both claims can
be brought and enforced independently of each other. 135
Even if it is possible to enforce both the Wiretap Act and SCA in some instances,
the Ninth Circuit in Davis found that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded a
claim under the SCA.136 The Ninth Circuit found that communications at issue in
Davis, the GET requests sent to Facebook, were not the same communications as
those entered into the plaintiffs’ toolbar.137 Any URL information displayed on the
plaintiffs’ browser toolbars merely informed them of their browser’s location on
the internet, so was not “incidental” to the sending of the GET requests at issue,
and therefore not protected by the SCA. 138
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, while the SCA was intended by Congress to be
broadly construed, its legislative history indicates that it aims to protect against
unauthorized access of communications stored in facilities owned by third
parties.139 The SCA usually only applies to cases involving a centralized datamanagement entity, like an external server, and unlike the browser toolbars alleged
by Plaintiffs to be a “facility” under the SCA. 140 Plaintiffs’ argument that their
browsing histories preserved for backup protection were protected by the SCA was
131.

Id. at 608.
Id.
133. Id. at 608-09; see Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 21-22
(1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010).
134. Blumofe, 329 F.3d at 21-22.
135. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705.
136. Davis, 956 F.3d at 608-09.
137. Id. at 609.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
132.
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similarly rejected by the Ninth Circuit. The court reasoned that browsing histories
are not “communications,” but instead merely records of URL addresses they had
visited, so are not protected by the SCA. 141
Finally, the Ninth Circuit reached the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims against
Facebook.142 Breach of contract has four elements: (1) existence of a contract
between plaintiffs and Facebook; (2) plaintiffs’ performance under that contract;
(3) Facebook’s breach of that contract; and (4) damages to plaintiffs caused by
Facebook’s breach of the contract.143 The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs did not
form a contract with Facebook that included any promise by Facebook to no track
logged-out users, so their claim for breach of contract was not adequately
pleaded.144
Plaintiffs alleged that they formed a contract with Facebook through Facebook’s
“Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” (“SRR”).145 The plaintiffs argued that
their contract with Facebook also included Facebook’s “Privacy Policy” (which
Facebook renamed its “Data Use Policy” during the class period).146 Facebook’s SRR
did not contain any promise not to track logged-out users, but when the litigation
started it directed users to read the Facebook Privacy Policy.147 Plaintiffs argued
that this document was incorporated into the SRR and became part of their contract
with Facebook.148 The Court argued, however, that even if the Privacy Policy was
incorporated into the SRR by language included in the SRR, there was no promise
by Facebook in the version of the Privacy Policy that existed at the start of litigation
to not track logged-out users.149
The later Data Use policy contained a promise by Facebook not to track loggedout users.150 Plaintiffs argued that the Data Use policy established a separate
contract between them and Facebook, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed. 151 A contract
requires an exchange for a promise.152 The promise plaintiffs aim to enforce in Davis
is Facebook’s promise in its Data Use Policy not to track its logged-out users.153
However, the Ninth Circuit found that this promise by Facebook did not include an

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id. at 610-11.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“exchange” by Facebook’s users sufficient to form a contract. 154 There was no
commitment by Facebook’s users in return for that promise, so their claim for
breach of contract was not adequately pleaded.155
Davis represents a win for Facebook users interested in preserving data privacy
protections. The Ninth Circuit upheld in part, and reversed in part the decision of
the District Court for the Northern District of California by finding that the Plaintiffs
had standing and were able to adequately plead claims for invasion of privacy,
intrusion upon seclusion, trespass to chattels and fraud, statutory larceny, as well
as claims brought pursuant to the Wiretap Act, CIPA, and Computer Data Access
and Fraud Act; although did not have standing to bring their breach of contract and
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, or their claims
brought pursuant to the SCA.156 Although the case has only made it past the
pleading stage at this point, the opinion indicates an increase in the judiciary
branch’s efforts to step in as a protector for internet users. 157 The Judiciary will not
be able to preserve data privacy protections alone though, and the Davis opinion
also makes clear that the current statutory and regulatory frameworks in the United
States are inadequate to properly protect personal information from Websites like
Facebook.158
iii. Discussion

The decision in Davis has broad implications on privacy law and potentially
heightens liability for websites that tracking user internet activity. 159 While Davis
shows that courts are stepping forward to protect the online data privacy interests
of internet users, courts opinions alone will not be enough to curb the tracking of
these websites.160 Governments, at the federal or state level, should consider
broader legislative or regulatory schemes to protect the data privacy interests of
internet users, looking to the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) and California’s Consumer Protection Privacy Act (CCPA) as examples of
such schemes.161

154.

Id. at 610-11.
Id.
156. Id. at 611.
157. See infra Section III.B.
158. See infra Section III.C.
159. Erik Manukyan, Summary: Ninth Circuit Permits Federal Wiretap Act Claim Against Facebook, LAWFARE
(Apr. 24, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-ninth-circuit-permits-federal-wiretap-actclaim-against-facebook. See infra Section III.A.
160. See infra Section III.B, III.C.
161. See infra Section III.C.
155.
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A. Implications of Davis on Websites Tracking the Activity of Their Users
Facebook, whose information-gathering practices are at issue in the Davis
decision, is the largest social media site in the world. 162 In 2019, 69% (over twothirds) of U.S. adults reported that they use Facebook, either online or through their
mobile phone.163 Facebook has international reach too: as of April 2020, Facebook
has nearly 2.5 billion active users and is used by nearly two-thirds of the 3.81 billion
active social media users worldwide.164
However, the reach of the decision in Davis extends far past Facebook alone.
Other large social media companies whose data usage practices may be implicated
by the Ninth Circuit’s decision include Instagram, with 1 billion active monthly users;
Snapchat, with 360 million monthly users; and Twitter, with 330 million monthly
users.165 Like Facebook, these other large social media companies are also
headquartered in California.166 California is within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, so
the Ninth Circuit’s holding against Facebook in Davis will also affect future litigation
against these other top social media companies.167
B. Efforts by Courts in Protecting Online Data Privacy of Internet Users
Davis shows that the Ninth Circuit (and district courts within the Ninth Circuit)
will have more permissive pleading standards in consumer data privacy cases
moving forward, which may increase the liability for social media sites that use
browser cookies to track their users’ data.168 The Ninth Circuit’s finding that unjust
enrichment could confer standing to plaintiffs for their trespass to chattels claim
and other California state fraud-based claims may also subject internet companies

162. Maryam Mohsin, 10 Social Media Statistics You Need to Know in 2021 [Infographic], OBERLO,
https://www.oberlo.com/blog/social-media-marketing-statistics (last updated Apr. 5, 2021).
163. Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including Facebook, is
Mostly Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since2018/.
164. Most Popular Social Media Platforms in 2020, OBERLO, https://www.oberlo.com/statistics/mostpopular-social-media-platforms (last visited Dec. 19, 2020).
165. Kristi Kellogg, The 7 Biggest Social Media Sites in 2020, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.searchenginejournal.com/social-media/biggest-social-media-sites/
(the monthly user amounts listed above reflect active monthly users as of February 2020).
166. Id.
167. What
is
the
Ninth
Circuit?,
U.S.
CTS.
FOR
THE
NINTH
CIR.,
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial_council/what_is_the_ninth_circuit.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2020)
[hereinafter Ninth Circuit Jurisdiction].
168. See Emily A. Jordan, Sharing More Than You Thought: Facebook Cannot Assert the Party Exception to
Avoid Liability Under the Wiretap Act, 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. II-205, 223-25 (2021).
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to greater liability.169 The expansive view of standing adopted by the Ninth Circuit
in Davis also signals that the Ninth Circuit is serious about protecting user data
privacy from overreach by social media companies.170 Such broad standing under
California law, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, could have a negative effect on
the many internet businesses based in the “silicon valley” technology hub of San
Francisco, which are located in California and subject to federal appeals in the Ninth
Circuit.171
C. The Role That Legislative and Regulatory Schemes Can Play in Protection of the
Data Privacy Interests of Internet Users
The decision in Davis shows that current laws regulating the collection and use
of user data are ambiguous, so a new legal framework is needed to ensure that
consumers can keep their sensitive data private and are adequately informed of the
tracking practices of websites they visit.172 Broader legal protections could be
implemented by amending and updating old and archaic statutes, like the Federal
Wiretap Act statutes.173 With their decision in Davis, the Ninth Circuit strengthens
the Wiretap Act’s applicability to user browser cookies, but also reflects the
limitations of the decades-old statute’s use in policing privacy violations that occur
in newer technological contexts.174 The original 1968 version of the Electronic
Communications Protection Act (ECPA), which established the Wiretap Act, was
enacted before the widespread use of computers to communicate, so it mainly

169. Benkat Balasubramani, Ninth Circuit Reinstates Decade-Old Lawsuit Against Facebook For Tracking
Logged-Out Users–In re Facebook Internet Tracking, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/04/ninth-circuit-reinstates-decade-old-lawsuit-against-facebookfor-tracking-logged-out-users-in-re-facebook-internet-tracking.htm.
170. Id.
171. Ninth Circuit Jurisdiction, supra note 167.
172. Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Internet Tracking Litigation), 956 F.3d 589, 604 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting
examples of how courts have grappled with ambiguity in the current legal scheme, such as how to determine
who qualifies as a “party” for purposes of the Wiretap Act’s exemption from liability for those who are “party”
to the communication).
173. See Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy is a Losing Game Today – and How to Change the Game,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-gametoday-and-how-to-change-the-game/ (explaining how the pace of personal data found online has grown
significantly over the past several years and laws cannot keep up, a significant overhaul of the current legal
framework is needed).
174. Davis, 956 F.3d at 598 (“[T] he legislative history and statutory text demonstrate that Congress and the
California legislature intended to protect these historical privacy rights when they passed the Wiretap Act, SCA,
and CIPA [and] thus, these statutory provisions codify a substantive right to privacy, the violation of which gives
rise to a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.”). See also id. at 608 (explaining how the SCA requires
that Plaintiffs make a showing that the defendant internet company “gained unauthorized access to a ‘facility’”
where it accessed electronic communications in ‘electronic storage[,]’” even though this means that many
current data privacy claims will not be protected by the act).
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dealt with oral communications by telephone—far different from the digital data at
issue in Davis.175
In 1986 and through subsequent amendments, the ECPA was broadened to
cover breaches of private data communications, either collected in real-time
(protected by the Wiretap Act), or collected while in storage (protected by the
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)). This distinction became more important in
1986, when the SCA was established, because computer storage was much more
expensive.176 However, computer storage has now become much cheaper and
there is a less rigid distinction between “electronic storage” and real-time
communication, which is instead protected by the Wiretap Act.177 The similarity and
overlap between stored communications and real-time communications provides
an example of how courts struggle to conform the ECPA to new internet
technologies.178 A new amendment to the ECPA could help courts uniformly
recognize the role user data plays in our society, so that they can better deal with
current information technology realities that consumers may face. 179
Another way to protect user privacy could be the enactment of new regulations
to police websites’ use of the data of their users. Recent regulatory schemes, like
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 180 and California’s
Consumer Protection Privacy Act (CCPA),181 have been enacted to protect web user
privacy. While both regulatory schemes are focused on protecting consumer
privacy by limiting the scope of when websites can sell users’ data as well as
increasing transparency requirements on those websites by imposing of penalties

175.

Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 381 (2014).
Id. at 386, 391.
177. Id. at 391.
178. Id. at 395; see Michael E. Lackey & Oral Pottinger, United States: Stored Communications Act: Practical
Considerations,
MONDAQ
(July
13,
2018),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/privacyprotection/717180/stored-communications-act-practical-considerations (“[T]he SCA’s age . . . makes it difficult
to apply in modern times.”).
179. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/ecpa/ (last visited
July 22, 2021) (mentioning that numerous amendments to the ECPA have been advocated for, “including an
across-the-board warrant requirement, search notice and returns for users, protection of location data, and
mandatory data minimization and end-to-end encryption for commercial e-mail services”).
180. Ben Wolford, What is the GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR EU, https://gdpr.eu/whatis-gdpr/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (describing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as “the toughest
privacy and security law in the world” by imposing “harsh fines” on those found to be in violation of its
standards, one example of which is only permitting businesses to collect data that is necessary for specified
purposes and requiring business to impose appropriate data security measures).
181. California Consumer Privacy, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1738 - 3273.16; see also California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (explaining how
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) protects data privacy by requiring that individuals be properly
notified of what personal information businesses are collecting as well as requiring that businesses allow
individuals to opt-out of having their personal information sold).
176.
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and fines on companies found to be in violation,182 the CCPA and GDPR have some
differences.183 The CCPA protects a broader amount of user data than the GDPR—
the GDPR only protects individual data, but the CCPA also extends to household
data.184 However, the GDPR gives more robust protections than the CCPA because
the GDPR gives users the right to prior consent, requiring websites to disclose data
use and gain consent from their users before using their users’ data.185 On the other
hand, the CCPA merely gives users the right to opt-out of having their data used,
only allowing users to protect their data after it has been used.186
The EU’s GDPR provides a strong system of regulation ensuring user privacy, 187
but it does have some drawbacks.188 The GDPR incidentally regulates web
companies that may only have a few customers in the European Union, burdening
even relatively small companies from other places in the world with the relatively
higher cost of GDPR compliance.189 While the strict requirements for compliance
with the GDPR place new burdens on both large and small businesses, the GDPR’s
intense enforcement also ensures that web companies focus on cybersecurity and
their handling of user data.190 Increased focus by websites on cybersecurity risks
and increased control given to consumers over how their data is used will also
restore consumer trust in the web companies handling their personal data. 191 A
strongly enforced and more extensive consumer privacy regulatory framework like
the GDPR is also needed in the United States, and California’s CCPA is a step towards
that better system.192
More robust consumer privacy regulation and disclosure requirements would
benefit both consumers and social media websites alike by increasing the
transparency of social media companies using consumer data for profit and giving
182. CCPA vs. GDPR – Differences and Similarities, DATA PRIV. MANAGER (Aug. 01, 2020),
https://dataprivacymanager.net/ccpa-vs-gdpr/.
183. CCPA vs GDPR, COOKIEBOT, https://www.cookiebot.com/en/ccpa-vs-gdpr/ (updated Nov. 30, 2020).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Wolford, supra note 180 (exploring some of the GDPR’s requirements, such as requiring companies to
implement measures to protect user data such as end-to-end encryption, or only allowing personal data to be
processed in specific circumstances, such as when it is necessary to enter into a contract or may help save
someone’s life).
188. Eline Chivot, Two Years On, the GDPR’s Flaws Show Why the EU Should Avoid Additional Rules, CTR. FOR
DATA INNOVATION (June 24, 2020), https://datainnovation.org/2020/06/two-years-on-the-gdprs-flaws-showwhy-the-eu-should-avoid-additional-rules/.
189. Lars Koudal, GDPR Benefits – Pros and Cons, CLEVER PLUGINS, https://cleverplugins.com/pros-cons-gdpr/
(last visited Dec. 19, 2020).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Bernard Gallagher, Will the U.S. Adopt a Nationwide Data Privacy Law Similar to GDPR?, I.S. PARTNERS,
https://www.ispartnersllc.com/blog/us-nationwide-data-privacy-law-gdpr/ (updated Dec. 21, 2020).
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consumers better control over what data they choose to share with internet
companies.193 Consumers have become more aware of cookies and their role in
tracking user information. A 2006 report found that while over 90% of internet
consumers claimed to know what internet cookies were, only 15.5% of those
claiming they knew about cookies actually demonstrated even simple knowledge
about internet cookies.194 However, a 2012 survey found that much wider user
knowledge about cookies, with 69% of respondents reporting that they were aware
of internet cookies and how cookies are used to collect user data.195
Along with their heightened awareness of the role of browser cookies,
consumers are now also more likely to limit or reject data collection by browser
cookies. The 2012 study referenced above found that 73% of respondents regularly
managed their browser’s cookie settings.196 Research from the fourth quarter of
2017 indicated that consumers either blocked or deleted 64% of the tracking
cookies used by advertising firms for digital advertising. 197 This shows that
consumers have low trust in internet cookies and are concerned about their privacy
being encroached on by the websites they visit. More clear laws regulating social
media companies’ tracking of user data and more transparent required disclosure
practices would address this concern.198
The ambiguity of the current legal framework policing user data privacy is also
felt by social media companies themselves.199 Web companies who fear liability
under the Wiretap Act may have to defensively adopt new practices to ensure they
properly disclose any tracking of their users.200 In fact, third-party tracking cookies
are being phased out of use by many websites, partly in response to new regulations

193. Karen Schuler, Federal Data Privacy Regulation is on the Way – That’s a Good Thing, IAPP (Jan. 22,
2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/federal-data-privacy-regulation-is-on-the-way-thats-a-good-thing/.
194. Anthony D. Miyazaki, Online Privacy and the Disclosure of Cookie Use: Effects on Consumer Trust and
Anticipated
Patronage,
27
J.
OF
PUB.
POL’Y
&
MKTG.
19,
21
(May
2008),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247837682_Online_Privacy_and_the_Disclosure_of_Cookie_Use_
Effects_on_Consumer_Trust_and_Anticipated_Patronage.
195. Graham Charlton, Just 23% of Web Users Would Say Yes to Cookies, ECONSULTANCY (Apr. 16, 2012),
https://econsultancy.com/just-23-of-web-users-would-say-yes-to-cookies/.
196. Id.
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like Europe’s GDPR and California’s CCPA.201 For instance, Google Chrome, a popular
internet browser, has unveiled a plan to end the use of third-party cookies entirely,
which would hamper advertising agencies’ efforts to track user data. 202
However, Facebook’s tracking of user internet history is considered first party,
so may not completely cease with the death of third-party tracking cookies.203 This
highlights an of the asymmetry fostered by current consumer privacy regulations:
they allow large companies like Facebook and Google, who already have first-party
access to user information within the “walled gardens” of their online ecosystems,
to continue accessing consumer data and using that data for profit, while smaller
web companies may struggle to gain similar access.204
Better regulation of the use of user data for profit would encourage social media
companies to be more honest about the relationship between their users’ data and
their advertising revenue.205 As recently as 2018, Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of
Facebook, has maintained that Facebook does not sell its users’ data.206 However,
Facebook’s internal documents revealed that it has allowed its business partners,
like Amazon and Microsoft, to access its users’ personal data in exchange for further
integration of Facebook’s social media services. 207 These partnerships and
exchanges of data “underscore how personal data has become the most prized
commodity of the digital age.”208 Yet Facebook and other internet companies must
continue to downplay and obfuscate their use of user personal data for profit. In
the wake of the privacy scandal discussed above, Facebook denied that it had not
violated user privacy by giving its business partners access to the data, but also
simultaneously acknowledged that they had to regain consumer trust in the wake
of its many privacy scandals.209 This reflects that the use of user data to generate
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revenue exists in a legal gray area and needs to be clarified with a better regulatory
system.210
A more transparent legal framework policing use of consumer data could give
consumers better control over what data they share with the social media
applications they use, leading to a more mutually beneficial and transparent
relationship between social media companies’ profitability and the data of their
users.211 The decision in Davis is a step in the right direction, toward a more
transparent relationship between users and websites, because it acknowledges that
user data is valuable and underscores the importance of giving users better control
over what personal information of theirs share with the websites they use. 212
Consumers want to use social media applications like Facebook, while social media
companies want to generate revenue with use data. If our laws acknowledge that
user data has value and is controlled by the users, it will allow users to enter into
transactions with websites implicating their data with full knowledge of the value
of that data and a better ability to limit unauthorized data use. 213 Even if tracking
cookies become outmoded, a better legal framework is needed to ensure that
consumers can protect their privacy, one which does not ignore the inextricable link
between social media companies’ revenue and their use of personal user data. 214
IV. Conclusion

By recognizing that the unauthorized use of user internet data can give plaintiffs
standing for economic claims and can implicate the Federal Wiretap Act, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Davis could have broad ramifications on websites’ liability for
using cookies or internet plugins.215 Although the case has only made it past the
pleading stage at this point, the opinion indicates an increase in the Ninth Circuit’s
efforts to step in as a protector for internet users. 216 Courts alone will not be able
to preserve data privacy protections though, and the Davis opinion makes clear that
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the current statutory and regulatory frameworks in the United States are
ambiguous inadequate to properly protect personal information from Websites like
Facebook.217 It may be time for state and federal governments to make drastic
changes to our legal schemes regulating online data protection to create a system
of laws that can better keep up with the times and changing technology. 218
Governments can look to the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and
California’s Consumer Protection Privacy Act (CCPA) for guidance and a place to
start in devising such a system.219
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